A backdoor set is a set of variables of a propositional formula such that fixing the truth values of the variables in the backdoor set moves the formula into some polynomial-time decidable class. If we know a small backdoor set we can reduce the question of whether the given formula is satisfiable to the same question for one or several easy formulas that belong to the tractable class under consideration. In this survey we review parameterized complexity results for problems that arise in the context of backdoor sets, such as the problem of finding a backdoor set of size at most k, parameterized by k. We also discuss recent results on backdoor sets for problems that are beyond NP.
Introduction
Satisfiability (SAT) is the classical problem of determining whether a propositional formula in conjunctive normal form (CNF) has a satisfying truth assignment. The famous Cook-Levin Theorem [22, 57] , stating that SAT is NP-complete, placed satisfiability as the cornerstone of complexity theory. Despite its seemingly specialised nature, satisfiability has proved to be extremely useful in a wide range of different disciplines, both from the practical as well as from the theoretical point of view. Satisfiability provides a powerful and general formalism for solving various important problems including hardware and software verification and planning [8, 75, 96, 53] . Satisfiability is the core of many reasoning problems in automated deduction; for instance, the package dependency management for the OpenSuSE Linux distribution and the autonomous controller for NASA's Deep Space One spacecraft are both based on satisfiability [6, 97] . Over the last two decades, SAT-solvers have become amazingly successful in solving formulas with hundreds of thousands of variables that encode problems arising from various application areas, see, e.g., [48] . Theoretical performance guarantees, however, are far from explaining this empirically observed efficiency. In fact, there is an enormous gap between theory and practice. To illustrate it with numbers, take the exponential factor 1.308 n of the currently fastest known exact 3SAT algorithm [51] . Already for n = 250 variables this number exceeds by far the expected lifetime of the sun in nanoseconds.
Hidden Structure and Parameterized Complexity
The discrepancy between theory and practice can be explained by the presence of a certain "hidden structure" in real-world problem instances. It is a widely accepted view that the structure of real-world problem instances makes the problems easy for heuristic solvers. However, classic worst-case analysis is not particularly well-suited to take this hidden structure into account. The classical model is one-dimensional, where only one aspect of the input (its size in bits, or the number of variables for a SAT formula) is taken into account, and it does not differentiate whether or not the instance is otherwise well-structured.
Parameterized Complexity, introduced by Mike Fellows together with Rod Downey offers a two-dimensional theoretical setting. The first dimension is the input size as usual, the second dimension (the parameter) allows to take structural properties of the problem instance into account. The result is a more fine-grained complexity analysis that has the potential of being more relevant to real-world computation while still admitting a rigorous theoretical treatment and firm algorithmic performance guarantees.
There are various ways of defining the "hidden structure" in a problem instance, yielding various ways to parameterize a problem.
Islands of Tractability
One way of coping with the high complexity of important problems within the framework of classical complexity is the identification of tractable subproblems, i.e., of classes of instances for which the problem can be solved in polynomial time. Each class represents an "island of tractability" within an ocean of intractable problems. For the satisfiability problem, researchers have identified dozens of such islands -one could speak of an archipelago of tractability.
Usually it is quite unlikely that a real-world instance belongs to a known island of tractability, but it may be close to one. A very natural and humble way of parameterizing a problem is hence to take the distance to an island of tractability as a parameter. Guo et al. [50] called this approach "distance to triviality". For SAT, the distance is most naturally measured in terms of the smallest number variables that need to be instantiated or deleted such that the instance gets moved to an island of tractability. Such sets of variables are called backdoor sets because once we know a small backdoor set we can solve the instance efficiently. Thus backdoor sets provide a "clever reasoning shortcut" through the search space and can be used as an indicator for the presence of a hidden structure in a problem instance. Backdoor sets where independently introduced by Crama et al. [27] and by Williams et al. [98] , the latter authors coined the term "backdoor".
The backdoor set approach to a problem consists of two steps: first a small backdoor set is computed (backdoor detection), second the backdoor set is used to solve the problem at hand (backdoor evaluation). It is hence natural to consider an upper bound on the size of a smallest backdoor set as a parameter for both backdoor detection and backdoor evaluation.
Satisfiability
The propositional satisfiability problem (SAT) was the first problem shown to be NPhard [22, 57] . Despite its hardness, SAT solvers are increasingly leaving their mark as a general-purpose tool in areas as diverse as software and hardware verification, automatic test pattern generation, planning, scheduling, and even challenging problems from algebra [48] .
A literal is a propositional variable x or a negated variable ¬x. We also use the notation x = x 1 and ¬x = x 0 . A clause is a finite set literals that does not contain a complementary pair x and ¬x. A propositional formula in conjunctive normal form, or CNF formula for short, is a set of clauses. An rCNF formula is a CNF formula where each clause contains at most r literals. For a clause C we write var(C) = { x : x ∈ C or ¬x ∈ C }, and for a CNF formula F we write var(F ) = C∈F var(C). An r-CNF formula is a CNF formula where each clause contains at most r literals. For a set S of literals we write S = { x 1−ǫ : x ǫ ∈ S }. We call a clause C positive if C = var(C) and negative if C = var(C).
For a set X of propositional variables we denote by 2 X the set of all mappings τ : X → {0, 1}, the truth assignments on X. For τ ∈ 2 X we let true(τ ) = { x τ (x) : x ∈ X } and false(τ ) = { x 1−τ (x) : x ∈ X } be the sets of literals set by τ to 1 and 0, respectively. Given a CNF formula F and a truth assignment τ ∈ 2 X we define
A CNF formula F is satisfiable if there is some τ ∈ 2 var(F ) with F [τ ] = ∅, otherwise F is unsatisfiable. Two CNF formulas are equisatisfiable if either both are satisfiable, or both are unsatisfiable. SAT is the NP-complete problem of deciding whether a given CNF formula is satisfiable [22, 57] .
Islands of Tractability and Backdoors
Backdoors are defined with respect to a fixed class C of CNF formulas, the base class (or target class, or more more figuratively, island of tractability). From a base class we require the following properties: (i) C can be recognized in polynomial time, (ii) the satisfiability of formulas in C can be decided in polynomial time, and (iii) C is closed under isomorphisms (i.e., if two formulas differ only in the names of their variables, then either both or none belong to C).
Several base classes considered in this survey also satisfy additional properties. Consider a class C of CNF formulas. C is clause-induced if it is closed under subsets, i.e., if F ∈ C implies F ′ ∈ C for each F ′ ⊆ F . C is clause-defined if for each CNF formula F we have F ∈ C if and only if {C} ∈ C for all clauses C ∈ F . C is closed under variable-disjoint union if for any two CNF formulas F 1 , F 2 ∈ C with var(F 1 ) ∩ var(F 2 ) = ∅, also F 1 ∪ F 2 ∈ C. C is self-reducible if for any F ∈ C and any partial truth assignment τ , also
A strong C-backdoor set of a CNF formula F is a set B of variables such that
. A weak C-backdoor set of F is a set B of variables such that F [τ ] is satisfiable and F [τ ] ∈ C holds for some τ ∈ 2 B . A deletion C-backdoor set of F is a set B of variables such that F −B ∈ C, where F −B = C \ x 0 , x 1 : x ∈ B : C ∈ F . If we know a strong C-backdoor set of F of size k, we can reduce the satisfiability of F to the satisfiability of 2 k formulas in C. Thus SAT becomes fixed-parameter tractable in k. If we know a weak C-backdoor set of F , then F is clearly satisfiable, and we can verify it by trying for each τ ∈ 2 X whether F [τ ] is in C and satisfiable. If C is clause-induced, any deletion C-backdoor set of F is a strong C-backdoor set of F . For several base classes, deletion backdoor sets are of interest because they are easier to detect than strong backdoor sets. The challenging problem is to find a strong, weak, or deletion C-backdoor set of size at most k if it exists. For each class C of CNF formulas we consider the following decision problems.
STRONG C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION Instance: A CNF formula F and an integer k ≥ 0. Parameter: The integer k. Question: Does F have a strong C-backdoor set of size at most k?
The problems WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION and DELETION C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION are defined similarly.
In fact, for the backdoor approach we actually need the functional variants of these problems, where if a backdoor set of size at most k exists, such a set is computed. However, for all cases considered in this survey, where backdoor detection is fixedparameter tractable, the respective algorithms also compute a backdoor set.
We also consider these problems for formulas with bounded clause lengths. All such results are stated for 3CNF formulas, but hold, more generally, for rCNF formulas, where r ≥ 3 is a fixed integer.
Base Classes
In this section we define the base classes for the SAT problem that we will consider in this survey.
Schaefer's Base Classes
In his seminal paper, Schaefer [90] classified the complexity of generalized satisfiability problems in terms of the relations that are allowed to appear in constraints. For CNF satisfiability, this yields the following five base classes 1 .
1. We denote the respective classes of CNF formulas by HORN, HORN − , 2CNF, 0-VAL, and 1-VAL, and we write Schaefer = HORN, HORN − , 2CNF, 0-VAL, 1-VAL . We note that all these classes are clause-defined, and by Schaefer's Theorem, these are the only maximal clause-defined base classes. We also note that 0-VAL and 1-VAL are the only two base classes considered in this survey that are not self-reducible.
Base Classes Based on Subsolvers
State-of-the-art SAT-solvers are based on variants of the so-called Davis-LogemannLoveland (DPLL) procedure [29, 30] (see also [23] ). The DPLL procedure searches systematically for a satisfying assignment, applying first unit propagation and pure literal elimination as often as possible. Then, DPLL branches on the truth value of a variable, and recurses. The algorithms stops if either there are no clauses left (the original formula is satisfiable) or all branches of the search lead to an empty clause (the original formula is unsatisfiable). Unit propagation takes as input a CNF formula F that contains a "unit clause" {x ǫ } and outputs F [x = ǫ]. Pure literal elimination takes as input a CNF formula F that has a "pure literal" x ǫ , where x ∈ var(F ) and x 1−ǫ / ∈ C∈F C, and outputs F [x = ǫ]. In both cases F and F [x = ǫ] are equisatisfiable. If we omit the branching, we get an incomplete algorithm which decides satisfiability for a subclass of CNF formulas. Whenever the algorithm reaches the branching step, it halts and outputs "give up". This incomplete algorithm is an example of a "subsolver" as considered by Williams et al. [98] . The DPLL procedure gives rise to three non-trivial subsolvers: UP + PL (unit propagation and pure literal elimination are available), UP (only unit propagation is available), PL (only pure literal elimination is available). We associate each subsolver with the class of CNF formulas for which it determines the satisfiability (this is well-defined, since unit propagation and pure literal elimination are confluent operations). Since the subsolvers clearly run in polynomial time, UP + PL, UP, and PL form base classes. We write Subsolver = {UP + PL, UP, PL}.
Miscellaneous Base Classes
Renamable Horn Let X be a set of variables and F a CNF formula. We let r X (F ) denote the CNF formula obtained from F by replacing for every variable x ∈ X, all occurrences of x ǫ in F with x 1−ǫ , for ǫ ∈ {0, 1}. We call r X (F ) a renaming of F . Clearly F and r X (F ) are equisatisfiable. A CNF formula is called renamable Horn if it has a renaming which is Horn, and we denote the class of renamable Horn formulas as RHORN. It is easy to see that HORN is a strict subset of RHORN. One can find in polynomial time a Horn renaming of a given CNF formula, if it exists [58] . Hence RHORN is a further base class. In contrast to HORN, RHORN is not clause-defined.
Forests Many NP-hard problems can be solved in polynomial time for problem instances that are in a certain sense acyclic. The satisfiability problem is no exception. There are various ways of defining a CNF formula to be acyclic. Here we consider acyclicity based on (undirected) incidence graphs: the incidence graph of a CNF formula F is the bipartite graph whose vertices are the variables and the clauses of F ; a variable x and a clause C are joined by an edge if and only if x ∈ var(C). Let FOREST denote the class of CNF formulas whose undirected incidence graphs are forests. It is well known that FOREST forms islands of tractability: the satisfiability of CNF formulas whose incidence graphs have bounded treewidth can be decided in linear time [43, 88] . FOREST is the special case of formulas with treewidth at most 1. [65] (FPT) FPT [65] FPT [65] C ∈ Subsolver W[P]-c [93] W[P]-c [93] n/a FOREST W[2]-h [46] (FPT [46] ) ? [78] CLU W[2]-h [66] (FPT) W[2]-h [66] (FPT [66] ) FPT [66] ( ) It is indicated in parentheses if the complexity of the problem for 3CNF formulas is different from general CNF or unknown. ? It is open whether the problem is fixed-parameter tractable. † Theorem 5 gives an fpt approximation for this problem. n/a Deletion backdoor sets are undefined for base classes that are not clause-induced. Clusters A CNF formula F is called a hitting if any two distinct clauses clash. Two clauses C, C ′ ∈ F clash if they contain a complimentary pair of literals, i.e., C ∩ C ′ = ∅. A CNF formula is called a clustering formula if it is a variable disjoint union of hitting formulas. We denote by CLU the class of clustering formulas. Clustering formulas not only allow polynomial-time SAT decision, one can even count the number of satisfying truth assignments in polynomial time. This is due to the fact that each truth assignment invalidates at most one clause of a hitting formula [52, 66] .
Base Class
WEAK STRONG DELETION C ∈ Schaefer W[2]-h† (?) FPT RHORN W[2]-h W[2]-h (?) FPT
Detecting Weak Backdoor Sets
It turns out that for all base classes C considered in this survey, WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is W[2]-hard. In several cases, restricting the input formula to 3CNF helps, and makes WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION fixed-parameter tractable.
In the proof of the following proposition we use a general approach that entails previously published proofs (such as in [46, 65, 66] ) as special cases.
Proof. We show W[2]-hardness for C ∈ {2CNF, HORN, 0-VAL, RHORN, FOREST, CLU}. The hardness proofs for the remaining two classes 1-VAL and HORN − are symmetric to the proofs for 0-VAL and HORN, respectively.
Let G be a CNF formula with a set X ⊆ var(G) of its variables marked as external, all other variables of G are called internal. We call G an or-gadget for a base class C if G has the following properties:
First, we show the following meta-result, and then we define or-gadgets for the different base-classes.
Claim 1: If C is clause-induced, closed under variable-disjoint union, and has an or-gadget for any number ≥ 1 of external variables, then WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is W[2]-hard.
We prove the claim by giving a parameterized reduction from the W[2]-complete problem HITTING SET (HS) [33] . Let (S, k), S = {S 1 , . . . , S m }, be an instance of HS. Let I = {1, . . . , m} × {1, . . . , k + 1}. For each S i we construct k + 1 or-gadgets
whose external variables are exactly the elements of S i , and whose internal variables do not appear in any of the other gadgets G
. From Property 6 it follows that F can be constructed from S in polynomial time. We show that S has a hitting set of size k if and only if F has a weak C-backdoor set of size k. 
is satisfiable, and since C is closed under variable-disjoint union, F [τ ] belongs to C. Thus B is a weak C-backdoor set of F of size k.
Conversely, assume that B ⊆ var(F ) is a weak C-backdoor set of F of size k. Hence, there exists a truth assignment τ ∈ 2 B such that F [τ ] is satisfiable and belongs to C. Clearly for each (i, j) ∈ I, G
of the same gadget. From Property 5 it follows that all the k + 1 copies are different. Since |B| ≤ k, there must be some x i ∈ B such that there are 1 ≤ j ′ < j ′′ ≤ k + 1
Hence we have indeed a parameterized reduction from HS to WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION, and Claim 1 is shown true. We define for each class C ∈ {2CNF, HORN, 0-VAL, RHORN, FOREST, CLU} an or-gadget F (C) where X = {x 1 , . . . , x s } is the set of external variables; internal variables are denoted z i .
Since the considered classes C are clearly clause-induced and closed under variabledisjoint union, the proposition now follows from Claim 1.
⊓ ⊔ For base classes based on subsolvers, weak backdoor set detection is even W[P]-hard. This is not surprising, since the subsolvers allow a propagation through the formula which is similar to the propagation in problems like MINIMUM AXIOM SET or DE-GREE 3 SUBGRAPH ANNIHILATOR [33] . The proof of the following theorem is based on a reduction from the W[P]-complete problem CYCLIC MONOTONE CIRCUIT AC-TIVATION.
Theorem 1 ([93]). WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is W[P]-complete for all base classes C ∈ Subsolver. This even holds if the input formula is in 3CNF.
In summary, we conclude that WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is at least W[2]-hard for all considered base classes. If we restrict our scope to 3CNF formulas, we obtain mixed results.
Proposition 2. For every clause-defined class C, WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETEC-TION is fixed-parameter tractable for input formulas in 3CNF.
Proof. The result follows by a standard bounded search tree argument, sketched as follows. Assume we are given a CNF formula F / ∈ C and an integer k. We want to decide whether F has a weak C-backdoor set of size ≤ k. Since C is clause-defined, F contains a clause C such that {C} / ∈ C. Hence some variable of var(C) must belong to any weak C-backdoor set of F . There are at most 3 such variables, each of which can be set to true or to false. Hence we branch in at most 6 cases. By iterating this case distinction we build a search tree T , where each node t of T corresponds to a partial truth assignment τ t . We can stop building the tree at nodes of depth k and at nodes t where F [τ t ] ∈ C. It is now easy to see that F has a weak C-backdoor set of size at most k if and only if T has a leaf t such that F [τ t ] ∈ C and F [τ t ] is satisfiable. For each leaf we can check in polynomial time whether these properties hold.
⊓ ⊔ In particular, WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is fixed-parameter tractable for C ∈ Schaefer if the input formula is in 3CNF.
The proof of Proposition 2 can be extended to the class CLU of clustering formulas. Nishimura et al. [66] have shown that a CNF formula is a clustering formula if and only if it does not contain (i) two clauses
Each weak CLU-backdoor set of a CNF formula F must contain at least one variable from each overlap and each clash obstruction. However, if F is a 3CNF formula, the number of variables of an overlap obstruction is at most 5, and the number of variables of a clash obstruction is at most 7. Hence we can find a weak CLU-backdoor set of size at most k with a bounded search tree, which gives the following result. {¬z 1 , z s+1 }, {¬z 1 , ¬z s+1 }, {z 1 , z s+1 }}, where x 1 , . . . , x s are external variables and z 1 , . . . , z s+1 are internal variables. G can be considered as being obtained form the complete formula { {z
. . , z s+1 }, hence no external variable needs to be renamed. Moreover, we can satisfy G[x i = 0] by setting all external variables and z 1 to 0, and by setting z s+1 to 1.
Let (S, k), S = {S 1 , . . . , S m }, be an instance of HS. For each S i we construct
, each having S i as the set of its external variables, and the internal variables are new variables only used inside a gadget. We let F to be the union of all such gadgets G j i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1 we can easily show that S has a hitting set of size k if and only if F has a weak RHORN-backdoor set of size k. The proposition follows.
⊓ ⊔ According to Propositions 2 and 3, WEAK C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is fixed-parameter tractable for certain base classes C and input formulas in 3CNF. For the classes C covered by Propositions 2 and 3 it holds that for every 3CNF formula F / ∈ C we can find a set of variables of bounded size, an "obstruction", from which at least one variable must be in any weak C-backdoor set of F . Hence a weak C backdoor set of size at most k can be found by means of a bounded search tree algorithm. The next result shows that fixed-parameter tractability also prevails for the base class FOREST. However, the algorithm is considerably more complicated, as in this case we do not have obstructions of bounded size.
Theorem 2 ([46]). WEAK FOREST-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is fixed-parameter tractable for 3CNF formulas.
Proof (Sketch). We sketch the fpt algorithm from [46] deciding whether a 3CNF formula has a weak FOREST-backdoor set of size k. We refer to [46] for the full details and the correctness proof. Let G denote the incidence graph of F . The first step of the algorithm runs an fpt algorithm (with parameter k ′ ) by Bodlaender [9] that either finds k ′ = 2k + 1 vertex-disjoint cycles in G or a feedback vertex set of G of size at most 12k ′2 − 27k ′ + 15. In case a feedback vertex set X is returned, a tree decomposition of G \ X of width 1 is computed and X is added to each bag of this tree decomposition. As the WEAK FOREST-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION problem can be defined in Monadic Second Order Logic, a meta-theorem by Courcelle [26] can use this tree decomposition to conclude.
In case Bodlaender's algorithm returns k ′ vertex-disjoint cycles, the algorithm finds a set S * of O(4 k k 6 ) variables such that any weak FOREST-backdoor set of size k contains at least one variable from S * . In this case, the algorithm recurses by considering all possibilities of assigning a value to a variable from S * . Let C 1 , . . . , C k ′ denote the variable-disjoint cycles returned by Bodlaender's algorithm. Consider a variable x ∈ var(F ) and a cycle C. We say that x kills C internally if x ∈ C. We say that x kills C externally if x / ∈ C and C contains a clause u ∈ F such that x ∈ var(u).
As our k ′ cycles are all vertex-disjoint, at most k cycles may be killed internally. The algorithm goes through all choices of k cycles among C 1 , . . . , C k ′ that may be killed internally. All other cycles, say C 1 , . . . , C k+1 , are not killed internally and need to be killed externally. The algorithm now computes a set S ⊆ var(F ) of size O(k 6 ) such that any weak FOREST-backdoor set of size k, which is a subset of var(F ) \ k+1 i=1 var(C i ), contains at least one variable from S. The union of all such S, taken over all choices of cycles to be killed internally, forms then the set S * that was to be computed. For each cycle from C 1 , . . . , C k+1 , compute its set of external killers in var(F ) \ k+1 i=1 var(C i ). Only these external killers are considered from now on. If one such cycle has no such external killer, then there is no solution with the current specifications and the algorithm backtracks. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, let x i denote an external killer of C i with a maximum number of neighbors in C i . The algorithm executes the first applicable from the following rules.
Multi-Killer Unsupported If there is an index
ℓ ≥ 4k neighbors in C i and at most 4k 2 + k external killers of C i have at least ℓ/(2k) neighbors in C i , then include all these external killers in S.
Multi-Killer Supported If there is an index
neighbors in C i and more than 4k Proof. Consider a CNF formula F . Strong HORN-backdoor sets of F are exactly the vertex covers of the positive primal graph of F , whose vertex set is var(F ), two variables are joined by an edge if they appear together positively in a clause. Strong HORN − -backdoor sets can be characterized symmetrically. Strong 2CNF-backdoor sets of F are exactly the hitting sets of the hypergraph whose vertex set is var(F ) and whose hyperedges are all the subsets e ⊆ var(F ) of size three such that e ⊆ var(C) for a clause C ∈ F . Thus STRONG C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION for C ∈ {HORN, HORN − , 2CNF} can be accomplished by fpt algorithms for VERTEX COVER [19] and 3-HITTING SET [40] . The smallest strong 1-VAL-backdoor set of F is exactly the union of var(C) for all negative clauses C ∈ F , the smallest strong 0-VAL-backdoor set of F is exactly the union of var(C) for all positive clauses C ∈ F . ⊓ ⊔
Proposition 6. STRONG RHORN-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is W[2]-hard.
Proof. The proof uses a reduction from HS similar to the proof of Proposition 1. An instance (S, k), S = {S 1 , . . . , S m }, of HS is reduced to a formula F which is the union of certain gadgets
contains the four clauses S i ∪ {z 1 , z 2 }, {z 1 , ¬z 2 }, {¬z 1 , z 2 }, and V ∪ {¬z 1 , ¬z 2 }, where z 1 , z 2 are internal variables that do not occur outside the gadget. Let B ⊆ V be a hitting set of S and let τ ∈ 2 B . If τ sets at least one variable to 0, then τ removes from each gadget the only negative clause, hence r var(F ) (F [τ ]) ∈ HORN. On the other hand, if τ sets all variables from B to 1, then it removes from each gadget the only positive clause (B is a hitting set). Hence, F [τ ] ∈ HORN in this case. Consequently B is a strong RHORN-backdoor set of F . Conversely, assume B is a strong RHORN-backdoor set of F . Let τ ∈ 2 B be the all-1-assignment. For the sake of contradiction, assume there is a set
}} which is not renamable Horn, hence B is not a strong RHORN-backdoor set of F , a contradiction. Hence B is a hitting set of S.
⊓ ⊔ It is not known whether STRONG FOREST-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is fixedparameter tractable nor whether STRONG RHORN-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is fixed-parameter tractable for 3CNF formulas. For the former problem, however, we know at least an fpt approximation [46] ; see Theorem 5 below.
The following result is shown by a reduction from CYCLIC MONOTONE CIRCUIT ACTIVATION, similarly to Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 ([93]
). STRONG C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is W[P]-complete for every base class C ∈ Subsolver, even for formulas in 3CNF.
The bounded search tree method outlined above for WEAK CLU-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION for 3CNF formulas can clearly be adapted for strong backdoors. Hence we get the following result.
Proposition 7. STRONG CLU-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is fixed-parameter tractable for 3CNF formulas.

Empty Clause Detection
Dilkina et al. [31] suggested to strengthen the concept of strong backdoor sets by means of empty clause detection. Let E denote the class of all CNF formulas that contain the empty clause. For a base class C we put C {} = C ∪E; we call C {} the base class obtained from C by adding empty clause detection. Formulas often have much smaller strong C {} -backdoor sets than strong C-backdoor sets [31] . Dilkina et al. show that, given a CNF formula F and an integer k, determining whether F has a strong HORN {} -backdoor set of size k, is both NP-hard and co-NP-hard (here k is considered just as part of the input and not as a parameter). Thus, the non-parameterized search problem for strong HORN-backdoor sets gets harder when empty clause detection is added. It turns out that also the parameterized problem gets harder when empty clause detection is added.
Theorem 4 ([94]). For every clause-induced base class C such that at least one satisfiable CNF formula does not belong to
The theorem clearly applies to all base classes in Schaefer ∪ {RHORN, FOREST}. The proof from [94] relies on a reduction from [39] , where a reduction to 3CNF formulas is also given. Thus, Theorem 4 also holds for 3CNF formulas.
Detecting Deletion Backdoor Sets
In this section we consider the parameterized complexity of DELETION C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION for the various base classes C from above. For most of the classes the complexity is easily established as follows. For Schaefer classes, strong and deletion backdoor sets coincide, hence the FPT results carry over. The subsolver classes are not clause-induced, hence it does not make sense to consider deletion backdoor sets. DELETION FOREST-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION can be solved by algorithms for a slight variation of the feedback vertex set problem, and is therefore FPT. One has only to make sure that the feedback vertex set contains only variables and no clauses. This, however, can be achieved by using algorithms for WEIGHTED FEEDBACK VERTEX SET [77, 17] .
It is tempting to use Chen et al.'s FPT algorithm for directed feedback vertex set [20] for the detection of deletion backdoor sets. The corresponding base class would contain all CNF formulas with acyclic directed incidence graphs (the orientation of edges indicate whether a variable occurs positively or negatively). Unfortunately this class is not suited as a base class since it contains formulas where each clause contains either only positive literals or only negative literals, and SAT is well known to be NPhard for such formulas [45] .
Hence we are left with the classes CLU and RHORN. For the detection of deletion CLU-backdoor sets we can use overlap obstructions and clash obstructions, as defined before Proposition 3. With each obstruction, we associate a deletion pair which is a pair of sets of variables. With an overlap obstruction {C 1 , C 2 }, we associate the deletion pair
and with a clash obstruction {D 1 , D 2 , D 3 }, we associate the deletion pair
For a formula F , let G F denote the graph with vertex set var(F ) that has an edge xy if and only if there is a deletion pair {X, Y } of F with x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Nishimura et al. [66] have shown that a set X ⊆ var(F ) is a deletion CLU-backdoor set of F if and only if X is a vertex cover of G F . Thus, the detection of a deletion CLU-backdoor set of size k can be reduced to the problem of checking whether G F has a vertex cover of size k, for which there exist very fast algorithms (see for example [19] ).
Proposition 8 ([66]). DELETION CLU-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is fixed-parameter tractable.
The remaining case is the class RHORN. As noted by Gottlob and Szeider [49] without proof (see also [79] ), one can show fixed-parameter tractability of DELE-TION RHORN-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION by reducing it to the problem 2SAT DELETION. The latter problem takes as input a 2CNF formula and an integer k (the parameter), and asks whether one can make the formula satisfiable by deleting at most k clauses. 2SAT DELETION was shown fixed-parameter tractable by Razgon and O'Sullivan [79] . Here we give the above mentioned reduction.
Lemma 1.
There is a parameterized reduction from DELETION RHORN-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION to 2SAT DELETION.
Proof. Let (F, k) be a given instance of DELETION RHORN-BACKDOOR SET DE-TECTION. We construct a graph G = (V, E) by taking as vertices all literals x ǫ , for x ∈ var(F ) and ǫ ∈ {0, 1}, and by adding two groups of edges. The first group consists of all edges x 0 , x 1 for x ∈ var(F ), the second group consists of all edges x ǫ y δ for x, y ∈ var(F ), ǫ, δ ∈ {0, 1}, such that x ǫ , y δ ∈ C for some C ∈ F . Observe that the edges of the first group form a perfect matching M of the graph G. Claim 1. F has a deletion RHORN-backdoor set of size at most k if and only if G has a vertex cover with at most |M | + k vertices.
(⇒) Let B be a deletion RHORN-backdoor set of F of size at most k and
Hence e is covered by K. It remains to consider an edge f = x ǫ y δ of the second group. If x ∈ B or y ∈ B, then this edge is covered by K. Hence assume x, y / ∈ B. By construction of G, there is a clause C ∈ F with x ǫ , y δ ∈ C. Since x, y / ∈ B, there is also a clause C ′ ∈ F − B with x ǫ , y δ ∈ C. Since C ′ corresponds to a Horn clause C ′′ ∈ r X (F − B), at least one of the literals x ǫ , y δ belongs to N , and hence K covers the edge f . Hence the first direction of Claim 1 follows.
(⇐) Let K be a vertex cover of G with at most |M | + k vertices. Let B ⊆ var(F ) be the set of all variables x such that both
We show that r X (F − B) ∈ HORN. Let x δ , y ǫ be two literals that belong to a clause C ′′ of r X (F − B). We show that ǫ = 0 or δ = 0. Let C ′ ∈ F − B the clause that corresponds to C ′′ , and let
were chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that r X (F − B) ∈ HORN. Hence Claim 1 is shown.
Mishra et al. [63] already observed that a reduction from [16] can be adapted to show that this above-guarantee vertex cover problem can be reduced to 2SAT DELE-TION. For completeness, we give a reduction here as well.
We construct a 2CNF formula F 2 from G. For each vertex x ǫ of G we take a variable x ǫ . For each edge x 0 x 1 ∈ M we add a negative clause {¬x 0 , ¬x 1 }, and for each edge x ǫ y δ ∈ E \ M we add a positive clause {x ǫ , y δ }. Claim 2. G has a vertex cover with at most |M | + k vertices if and only if we can delete at most k negative clauses from F 2 to obtain a satisfiable formula.
(⇒) Let K be a vertex cover of G. We delete from F 2 all negative clauses {¬x 0 , ¬x 1 } where both x 0 , x 1 ∈ K (there are at most k such clauses) and obtain a 2CNF formula F ′ 2 . We define a truth assignment τ ∈ 2 var(F ′ 2 ) by setting a variable to 1 if and only if it belongs to K. It remains to show that τ satisfies F ′ 2 . The negative clauses are satisfied since τ sets exactly one literal of a negative clause {¬x 0 , ¬x 1 } ∈ F ′ 2 to 1 and exactly one to 0. The positive clauses are satisfied since each positive clause {x ǫ , y δ } corresponds to an edge x ǫ y δ ∈ E, and since K is a vertex cover, τ sets at least one of the variables x ǫ , y δ to 1.
(⇐) Let F ′ 2 be a satisfiable formula obtained from F 2 by deleting at most k negative
x ∈ var(F ) \ D }, and we observe that |K| ≤ |M | + k. It remains to show that K is a vertex cover of G. Consider an edge e = x 0 x 1 ∈ M of the first group.
∈ K, hence e is covered by K. Now consider an edge f = x ǫ y δ ∈ E \ M of the second group. If x ∈ D or y ∈ D then f is clearly covered by K. Hence assume x, y / ∈ D. By definition, there is a positive clause
Hence Claim 2 is shown. Next we modify F 2 by replacing each positive clause C = {x ǫ , y δ } with 2k + 2 "mixed" clauses {x ǫ , z We can delete at most k negative clauses from F 2 to obtain a satisfiable formula if and only if we can delete at most k clauses from F * 2 to obtain a satisfiable formula.
The claim follows easily from the following considerations. We observe that each pair of mixed clauses {x ǫ , z i C }, {¬z i C , y δ } is semantically equivalent with C = {x ǫ , y δ }. Hence, if F 2 can be made satisfiable by deleting some of the negative clauses, we can also make F * 2 satisfiable by deleting the same clauses. However, deleting some of the mixed clauses does only help if we delete at least one from each of the k + 1 pairs that correspond to the same clause C. Hence also Claim 3 is shown true. Claims 1-3 together establish the lemma. ⊓ ⊔ Razgon and O'Sullivan's result [79] together with Lemma 1 immediately give the following.
Proposition 9. DELETION RHORN-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION is fixed-parameter tractable.
Permissive Problems
We consider any function p that assigns nonnegative integers to CNF formulas as a satisfiability parameter. In particular we are interested in such satisfiability parameters p for which the following parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable:
SAT(p)
Instance: A CNF formula F and an integer k ≥ 0. Parameter: The integer k. Task: Determine whether F is satisfiable or determine that p(F ) > k.
Note that an algorithm that solves the problem has the freedom of deciding the satisfiability of some formulas F with p(F ) > k, hence the exact recognition of formulas F with p(F ) ≤ k can be avoided. Thus SAT(p) is not a usual decision problem, as there are three different outputs, not just two. If SAT(p) is fixed-parameter tractable then we call p an fpt satisfiability parameter, and we say that "the satisfiability of CNF formulas of bounded p is fixed-parameter tractable" (cf. [92] ). We write 3SAT(p) if the input is restricted to 3CNF formulas.
Backdoor sets provide a generic way to define satisfiability parameters. Let C be a base class and F a CNF formula. We define wb C (F ), sb C (F ) and db C (F ) as the size of a smallest weak, strong, and deletion C-backdoor set of F , respectively.
Of course, if the detection of the respective C-backdoor set is fixed-parameter tractable, then wb C , sb C , and db C are fpt satisfiability parameters. However, it is possible that wb C , sb C , or db C are fpt satisfiability parameters but the corresponding C-backdoor set detection problem is W[1]-hard. The problems SAT(wb C ), SAT(sb C ), and SAT(db C ) can therefore be considered as more "permissive" versions of the "strict" problems WEAK, STRONG, and DELETION C-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION, the latter require to find a backdoor set even if the given formula is trivially seen to be satisfiable or unsatisfiable. The distinction between permissive and strict versions of problems have been considered in a related context by Marx and Schlotter [61, 62] for parameterized k-neighborhood local search. Showing hardness for permissive problems SAT(p) seems to be a much more difficult task than for the strict problems. So far we could establish only few such hardness results.
Proposition 10. SAT(wb
Proof. We will show a more general result, that W[1]-hardness holds for all base classes that contain all anti-monotone 2CNF formulas. A CNF formula is anti-monotone if all its clauses are negative. Let C be a base class that contains all anti-monotone 2CNF formulas.
We show that SAT(wb C ) is W[1]-hard by reducing from PARTITIONED CLIQUE, also known as MULTICOLORED CLIQUE. This problem takes as input a k-partite graph and asks whether the graph has a clique on k vertices. The integer k is the parameter. The problem is well-known to be W[1]-complete [73] .
Let H = (V, E) with V = k i=1 V i be an instance of this problem. We construct a CNF formula F as follows. We consider the vertices of H as variables and add clauses {¬u, ¬v} for any two distinct vertices such that uv / ∈ E. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we add the clause V i . This completes the construction of F . We show that the following statements are equivalent:
(1) F is satisfiable (2) H contains a k-clique. (3) F has a weak C-backdoor set of size at most k.
(1)⇒(2). Let τ be a satisfying assignment of F . Because of the clause V i , τ sets at least one variable of V i to 1, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k. As each V i is an independent set, F contains a clause {¬u, ¬v} for every two distinct vertices in V i . Thus, τ sets exactly one variable of V i to 1, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The clauses of F also imply that v i v j ∈ E for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, since otherwise τ would falsify the clause {¬v i , ¬v j }. Hence v 1 , . . . , v k induce a clique in H.
(2)⇒(3). Assume v 1 , . . . , v k induce a clique in H, with v i ∈ V i . We show that B = {v 1 , . . . , v k } is a weak C-backdoor set of F . Let τ ∈ 2 B be the truth assignment that sets all variables of B to 1. This satisfies all the clauses
is an anti-monotone 2CNF formula. Therefore it is in C and it is satisfiable as it is 0-valid. Hence B is a weak C-backdoor set of F .
(3)⇒(1). Any formula that has a weak backdoor set is satisfiable. Since all three statements are equivalent, we conclude that SAT(wb C ) is W[1]-hard. This shows the proposition for the base classes HORN, 2CNF, 0-VAL, and RHORN, as they contain all anti-monotone 2CNF formulas. The hardness for HORN − and 1-VAL follows by symmetric arguments from the hardness of HORN and 0-VAL, respectively.
⊓ ⊔
In general, if we have an fpt approximation algorithm [14, 21, 34] for a strict backdoor set detection problem, then the corresponding permissive problem SAT(p) is fixed-parameter tractable. For instance, if we have an fpt algorithm that, for a given pair (F, k) either outputs a weak, strong, or deletion C-backdoor set of F of size at most f (k) or decides that F has no such backdoor set of size at most k, then clearly wb C , sb C , and db C , respectively, is an fpt satisfiability parameter.
This line of reasoning is used in the next theorem to show that sb FOREST is an fpt satisfiability parameter. This result labels FOREST as the first nontrivial base class C for which sb C is an fpt satisfiability parameter and sb C = db C . Hence the additional power of strong FOREST-backdoor sets over deletion FOREST-backdoor sets is accessible.
Theorem 5 ([46]). STRONG FOREST-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION admits a 2
k fptapproximation. Hence SAT(sb FOREST ) is fixed-parameter tractable.
Proof (Sketch).
We sketch the fpt-approximation algorithm from [46] which either concludes that a CNF formula F has no strong FOREST-backdoor set of size k or returns one of size at most 2 k . We refer to [46] for the full details and the correctness proof. Let G denote the incidence graph of F . The first step of the algorithm runs, similarly to the proof of Theorem 2, the fpt algorithm (with parameter k ′ ) by Bodlaender [9] that either finds k ′ = k 2 2 k−1 + k + 1 vertex-disjoint cycles in G or a feedback vertex set of G of size at most 12k ′2 − 27k ′ + 15. In case a feedback vertex set X is returned, a tree decomposition of G\X of width 1 is computed and X is added to each bag of this tree decomposition. As the STRONG FOREST-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION problem can be defined in Monadic Second Order Logic, a meta-theorem by Courcelle [26] can be used to decide the problem in linear time using this tree decomposition.
In case Bodlaender's algorithm returns k ′ vertex-disjoint cycles, the algorithm finds a set S * of O(k 2k 2 k 2 −k ) variables such that every strong FOREST-backdoor set of size k contains at least one variable from S * . In this case, the algorithm recurses by considering all possibilities of including a variable from S * in the backdoor set. Let C 1 , . . . , C k ′ denote the variable-disjoint cycles returned by Bodlaender's algorithm. Consider a variable x ∈ var(F ) and a cycle C. We say that x kills C internally if x ∈ C. We say that x kills C externally if x / ∈ C and C contains two clause u, v ∈ F such that x ∈ u and ¬x ∈ v. We say in this case that x kills C externally in u and v.
The algorithm goes through all k ′ k ways to choose k cycles among C 1 , . . . , C k ′ that may be killed internally. All other cycles, say C 1 , . . . , C k ′′ with k ′′ = k ′ − k, are not killed internally. We refer to these cycles as C ′′ -cycles. The algorithm now computes a set S ⊆ var(F ) of size at most 2 such that any strong FOREST-backdoor set of size k, which is a subset of var(F ) \ k ′′ i=1 var(C i ), contains at least one variable from S. The union of all such S, taken over all choices of cycles to be killed internally, forms then the set S * that was to be computed.
From now on, consider only killers in var(
Note that any variable that does not kill C i internally, but kills the cycle Cx i = P i ∪ {x i } also kills the cycle C i externally in u i and v i . We refer to such external killers as interesting.
The algorithm executes the first applicable from the following rules.
No External Killer
If there is an index i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k ′′ , such that Cx i has no external killer, then set S := {x i }. Killing Same Cycles If there are variables y and z and at least 2 k−1 + 1 C ′′ -cycles such that both y and z are interesting external killers of each of these C ′′ -cycles, then set S := {y, z}. Killing Many Cycles If there is a variable y that is an interesting external killer of at least k · 2 k−1 + 1 C ′′ -cycles, then set S := {y}. Too Many Cycles Otherwise, set S = ∅.
For each s ∈ S * the algorithm calls itself recursively to compute a strong FORESTbackdoor set for F [s = 0] and for F [s = 1] with parameter k − 1. If both recursive calls return backdoor sets, the union of these two backdoor sets and {s} is a strong FOREST-backdoor set for F . It returns the smallest such backdoor set obtained for all choices of s, or NO if for each s ∈ S * at least one recursive call returned NO. ⊓ ⊔
Comparison of Parameters
Satisfiability parameters can be compared with respect to their generality. Let p, q be satisfiability parameters. We say that p is at least as general as q, in symbols p q, if there exists a function f such that for every CNF formula F we have p(F ) ≤ f (q(F )). Clearly, if p q and SAT(p) is fpt, then so is SAT(q). If p q but not q p, then p is more general than q. If neither p q nor q p then p and q are incomparable. As discussed above, each base class C gives rise to three satisfiability parameters wb C (F ), sb C (F ) and db C (F ). If C is clause-induced, then sb C db C ; and if C ⊆ C ′ , then sb C ′ sb C and db C ′ db C .
By associating certain graphs with CNF formulas one can use graph parameters to define satisfiability parameters. The most commonly used graphs are the primal, dual, and incidence graphs. The primal graph of a CNF formula F has as vertices the variables of F , and two variables are adjacent if they appear together in a clause. The dual graph has as vertices the clauses of F , and two clauses C, C ′ are adjacent if they have a variable in common (i.e., if var(C) ∩ var(C ′ ) = ∅). The incidence graph, as already defined above, is a bipartite graph, having as vertices the variables and the clauses of F ; a variable x and a clause C are adjacent if x ∈ var(C). The directed incidence graph is obtained from the incidence graph by directing an edge xC from x to C if x ∈ C and from C to x if ¬x ∈ C.
The treewidth of the primal, dual, and incidence graph gives fpt satisfiability parameters, respectively. The treewidth of the incidence graph is more general than the other two satisfiability parameters [56] . The clique-width of the three graphs provides three more general satisfiability parameters. However, these satisfiability parameters are unlikely fpt: It is easy to see that SAT remains NP-hard for CNF formulas whose primal graphs are cliques, and for CNF formulas whose dual graphs are cliques. Moreover, SAT, parameterized by the clique-width of the incidence graph is W[1]-hard, even if a decomposition is provided [67] . However, the clique-width of directed incidence graphs is an fpt satisfiability parameter which is more general than the treewidth of incidence graphs [25, 43] .
How do fpt satisfiability parameters based on decompositions and fpt satisfiability parameters based on backdoor sets compare to each other?
Each base class C considered above, except for the class FOREST, contains CNF formulas whose directed incidence graphs have arbitrarily large clique-width. Hence none of the decomposition based parameters is at least as general as the parameters sb C and db C . On the other hand, taking the disjoint union of n copies of a CNF formula multiplies the size of backdoor sets by n but does not increase the width. Hence no backdoor based parameter is more general than decomposition based parameters.
Thus, almost all considered backdoor based fpt satisfiability parameters are incomparable with almost all considered decomposition based fpt satisfiability parameters. A notable exception is the satisfiability parameter db FOREST . It is easy to see that the treewidth of the incidence graph of a CNF formula is no greater than the size of a smallest deletion FOREST-backdoor set plus one, as the latter forms a feedback vertex set of the incidence graph. Thus the treewidth of incidence graphs is a more general satisfiability parameter than the size of a smallest deletion FOREST-backdoor sets. However, one can construct CNF formulas F with sb FOREST (F ) = 1 whose directed incidence graph has arbitrarily large clique-width. Just take a formula whose incidence graph is a subdivision of a large square grid, and add a further variable x such that on each path which is a subdivision of one edge of the grid there is a clause containing x and a clause containing ¬x. Thus, the satisfiability parameter sb FOREST , which is fpt by Theorem 5, is incomparable to all the decomposition based satisfiability parameters considered above. Figure 1 shows the relationship between some of the discussed fpt satisfiability parameters.
Kernels
The use of strong or deletion backdoor sets for SAT decision, with respect to a base class C, involves two tasks: 1. backdoor detection, to find a strong (or deletion) backdoor set of size at most k, or to report that such a backdoor set does not exist, 2. backdoor evaluation, to use a given strong (or deletion) backdoor set of size at most k to determine whether the CNF formula under consideration is satisfiable.
In each case where backdoor detection is fixed-parameter tractable, one can now ask whether the detection problem admits a polynomial kernel. For instance, for the classes HORN and 2CNF, backdoor detection can be rephrased as VERTEX COVER or as 3-HITTING SET problems, as discussed above, and therefore admits polynomial kernels [18, 1] .
Backdoor evaluation is trivially fixed-parameter tractable for any base class, but it is unlikely that it admits a polynomial kernel.
Proposition 11 ([95]). C-BACKDOOR SET EVALUATION does not admit a polynomial kernel for any self-reducible base class
This proposition is a trivial consequence of the well-known result that SAT parameterized by the number of variables has no polynomial kernel unless NP ⊆ co-NP/poly [10, 44] , and the fact that var(F ) is always a strong C-backdoor set of F if C is selfreducible.
Less immediate is the question whether C-BACKDOOR SET EVALUATION admits a polynomial kernel if the inputs are restricted to 3CNF formulas, as 3SAT parameterized by the number of variables has a cubic kernel by trivial reasons. However, for HORN and 2CNF this question can be answered negatively.
Proposition 12 ([95]
). C-BACKDOOR SET EVALUATION does not admit a polynomial kernel for C ∈ {HORN, 2CNF} unless NP ⊆ co-NP/poly, even if the input formula is in 3CNF.
Backdoor Trees
Backdoor trees are binary decision trees on backdoor variables whose leaves correspond to instances of the base class. Every strong backdoor set of size k gives rise to a backdoor tree with at least k + 1 and at most 2 k leaves. It is reasonable to rank the hardness of instances in terms of the number of leaves of backdoor trees, thus gaining a more refined view than by just comparing the size of backdoor sets.
Consider the CNF formula F with variables x 1 , . . . , x 2n and y 1 , . . . , y n consisting of all clauses of the form {y i , ¬x 1 , . . . , ¬x 2i−2 , x 2i−1 , ¬x 2i , . . . , ¬x 2n }, {y i , ¬x 1 , . . . , ¬x 2i−1 , x 2i , ¬x 2i+1 , . . . , ¬x 2n }, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The set B = {y 1 , . . . , y n } is a strong HORN-backdoor set (in fact, B is the smallest possible). However, every HORN-backdoor tree T with var(T ) = {y 1 , . . . , y n } has 2 n leaves. On the other hand, the formula F has a HORN-backdoor tree T ′ with only 2n + 1 leaves where var(T ′ ) = {x 1 , . . . , x 2n }. Thus, when we want to minimize the number of leaves of backdoor trees, we must not restrict ourselves to variables of a smallest strong backdoor set.
The problem C-BACKDOOR TREE DETECTION now takes as input a CNF formula F , a parameter k, and asks whether F has a C-backdoor tree with at most k leaves.
A base class C is said to admit a loss-free kernelization if there exists a polynomialtime algorithm that, given a CNF formula F and an integer k, either correctly decides that F has no strong C-backdoor set of size at most k, or computes a set X ⊆ var(F ) such that the following conditions hold: (i) X contains all minimal strong C-backdoor sets of F of size at most k; and (ii) the size of X is bounded by a computable function that depends on k only.
Samer and Szeider [85] have shown that C-BACKDOOR TREE DETECTION is fixedparameter tractable for every base class C that admits a loss-free kernelization. Since Buss-type kernelization is loss-free, the two classes HORN and 2CNF admit a loss-free kernelization. Hence C-BACKDOOR TREE DETECTION is fixed-parameter tractable for C ∈ {2CNF, HORN}.
Backdoors for Problems Beyond NP
The backdoor approach has been successfully applied to obtain fixed-parameter tractability for problems whose unparameterized worst-case complexity lies beyond NP. In particular, FPT results have been obtained for the #P -complete problem Propositional Model Counting, the PSPACE-complete QBF-SAT problem, and problems of nonmonotonic reasoning and abstract argumentation that are located on the second level of the Polynomial Hierarchy. In this section we briefly survey these results.
Propositional Model Counting
The #SAT problem asks to compute for a given CNF formula F the number of assignments τ ∈ 2 var(F ) that satisfy F . This problem arises in several areas of Artificial Intelligence, in particular in the context of probabilistic reasoning [3, 83] . The problem is #P-complete and remains #P-hard even for monotone 2CNF formulas and Horn 2CNF formulas. It is NP-hard to approximate the number of satisfying assignments of a CNF formula with n variables within 2 n 1−ǫ for any ǫ > 0. This approximation hardness holds also for monotone 2CNF formulas and Horn 2CNF formulas [83] . However, if #SAT can be solved in polynomial time O(n c ) for the formulas of a base class C, and if we know a strong C-backdoor set of a formula F of size k, then we can compute the number of satisfying assignments of F in time O(2 k n c ) [66, 87] . For some applications in probabilistic reasoning one is interested in the weighted model counting (WMC) problem, which is more general than #SAT (see, e.g., [89, 15] ). Since the backdoor set approach applies also to the more general problem, we will use it for the following discussions.
A weighting w of a CNF formula F is a mapping w that assigns each variable x ∈ var(F ) a rational number 0 ≤ w(x) ≤ 1; this generalizes to literals by w(x) = 1−w(x) and to truth assignments τ ∈ 2 X by w(τ ) = x∈X w(x τ (x) ). We define # w (F ) as the sum of the weights of all assignments τ ∈ 2 var(F ) that satisfy F . The WMC problem asks to compute # w (F ) for a given CNF formula F and weighting w. WMC is clearly at least as hard as computing #(F ) as we can reduce #SAT to WMC by using the weight 1/2 for all n variables and multiplying the result by 2 n . A strong C-backdoor set X of a CNF formula F can be used to compute # w (F ) via the equation
It is easy to see that WMC is polynomial for the base classes CLU and FOREST as the corresponding algorithms for deciding satisfiability for these classes as discussed above allow a straightforward generalization to WMC. From Theorem 5 and Proposition 8 we conclude that WMC is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by sb FOREST and db CLU .
Quantified Boolean Formulas
Many important computational tasks like planning, verification, and several questions of knowledge representation and automated reasoning can be naturally encoded as the evaluation problem of quantified Boolean formulas (QBF) [69, 81, 84] . A QBF consists of a propositional CNF formula F (the "matrix") and a quantifier prefix. For instance F = ∀y ∀z ∃x ∃w F with F = {{¬x, y, ¬w}, {x, ¬y, w}, {¬y, z}, {y, ¬z}} is a QBF. The evaluation of quantified Boolean formulas constitutes a PSPACE-complete problem and is therefore believed to be computationally harder than the NP-complete propositional satisfiability problem [55, 71, 91] . Only a few tractable classes of quantified Boolean formulas are known where the number of quantifier alternations is unbounded. For example, the time needed to solve QBF formulas whose primal graph has bounded treewidth grows non-elementarily in the number of quantifier alternations [70] . Two prominent tractable classes with unbounded quantifier alternations are QHORN and Q2CNF which are QBFs where the matrix is a Horn or 2CNF formula, respectively. QHORN formulas and Q2CNF formulas can be evaluated in polynomial time due to well-known results of Kleine Büning et al. [13] and of Aspvall et al. [2] , respectively.
In order to evaluate a QBF formula with a small strong HORN-or 2CNF-backdoor set X efficiently, we require that X is closed under variable dependencies. That is, if x depends on y and x ∈ X, then also y ∈ X, where we say that x depends on y if the quantifier for y appears to the left of the quantifier for x, and one cannot move the quantifier for y to the right of x without changing the validity of the QBF. In general deciding whether a variable depends on the other is PSPACE complete, but there are "over-approximations" of dependencies that can be computed in polynomial time. Such over-approximations can be formalized in terms of dependency schemes. Indeed, it is fixed-parameter tractable to detect strong HORN or 2CNF-backdoor sets of size at most k that are closed with respect to any fixed polynomial-time decidable dependency scheme [86] . This fpt result allows an unbounded number of quantifier alternations for each value of the parameter, in contrast to the results for parameter treewidth.
Nonmonotonic Reasoning
Answer-Set Programming (ASP) is an increasingly popular framework for declarative programming [60, 64] . ASP allows to describe a problem by means of rules and constraints that form a disjunctive logic program P over a finite universe U of atoms. A rule r is of the form (x 1 ∨ · · · ∨ x l ← y 1 , . . . , y n , ¬z 1 , . . . , ¬z m ). We write {x 1 , . . . , x l } = H(r) (the head of r) and {y 1 , . . . , y n , z 1 , . . . , z m } = B(r) (the body of r), B + (r) = {y 1 , . . . , y n } and
M is a model of P if it satisfies all rules of P . The GL reduct of a program P under a set M of atoms is the program P M obtained from P by first removing all rules r with B − (r) ∩ M = ∅ and second removing all ¬z where z ∈ B − (r) from all remaining rules r [47] . M is an answer set of a program P if M it is a minimal model of P M . For instance, from the program P = {(tweety-flies ← tweety-is-a-bird, ¬tweety-is-a-penguin), (tweety-is-a-bird ←)} we may conclude that tweety-flies, since this fact is contained in the only answer set {tweety-is-a-bird, tweety-flies} of P . If we add the fact tweety-is-a-penguin to the program and obtain P ′ = P ∪ {(tweety-is-a-penguin ←)}, then we have to retract our conclusion tweety-flies since this fact is not contained in any answer set of P ′ (the only answer set of P ′ is {tweety-is-a-bird, tweety-is-a-penguin}). This nonmonotonic behaviour that adding a fact may allow fewer conclusions is typical for many applications in Artificial Intelligence. The main computational problems for ASP (such as deciding whether a program has a solution, or if a certain atom is contained in at least one or in all answer sets) are of high worst-case complexity and are located at the second level of the Polynomial Hierarchy [38] .
Also for ASP several islands of tractability are known, and it is possible to develop a backdoor approach [42] . Similar to SAT one can define partial truth assignments τ on a set of atoms and solve a disjunctive logic program P by solving all the reduced programs P [τ ]. However, the situation is trickier than for satisfiability. Although every answer set of P corresponds to an answer set of P [τ ] for some truth assignment τ , the reverse direction is not true. Therefore, one needs to run a check for each answer set of P [τ ] whether it gives rise to an answer set of P . Although this correctness check is polynomial, we must ensure that we do not need to carry it out too often. A sufficient condition for bounding the number of checks is that we can compute all answer sets of a program P ∈ C in polynomial time ("C is enumerable"). In particular, this means that P ∈ C has only a polynomial number of answer sets, and so we need to run the correctness check only a polynomial number of times.
Several enumerable islands of tractability have been identified and studied regarding the parameterized complexity of backdoor set detection [42] . For instance, programs where each rule head contains exactly one atom and each rule body is negation-free are well-known to have exactly one answer set. Such programs are called Horn programs, and similar to satisfiability, one can use vertex covers to compute backdoor sets with respect to Horn. Further enumerable islands of tractability can be defined by forbidding cycles in graphs, digraphs, and mixed graphs associated with disjunctive logic programs. Now, one can use feedback vertex set (fvs) algorithms for the considered graphs to compute backdoor sets: undirected fvs [33] , directed fvs [20] , and mixed fvs [12] . One can get even larger enumerable islands of tractability by labeling some of the vertices or edges and by only forbidding "bad" cycles, namely cycles that contain at least one labeled edge or vertex. For the undirected case one can use subset feedback vertex set algorithms to compute backdoor sets [28, 54] . Currently it is open whether this problem is fixed-parameter tractable for directed or mixed graphs. Even larger islands can be obtained by only forbidding bad cycles with an even number of labeled vertices or edges [41] . This gives rise to further challenging feedback vertex set problems.
Abstract Argumentation
The study of arguments as abstract entities and their interaction in form of attacks as introduced by Dung [35] has become one of the most active research branches within Artificial Intelligence, Logic and Reasoning [5, 7, 76] . Abstract argumentation provides suitable concepts and formalisms to study, represent, and process various reasoning problems most prominently in defeasible reasoning (see, e.g., [74, 11] ) and agent interaction (see, e.g., [72] ). An abstract argumentation system can be considered as a directed graph, where the vertices are called "arguments" and a directed edge from a to b means that argument a "attacks" argument b.
A main issue for any argumentation system is the selection of acceptable sets of arguments, called extensions. Whether or not a set of arguments is accepted is considered with respect to certain properties of sets of arguments, called semantics [4] . For instance, the preferred semantics requires that an extension is a maximal set of arguments with the properties that (i) the set is independent, and (ii) each argument outside the set which attacks some argument in the set is itself attacked by some argument in the set. Property (i) ensures that the set is conflict-free, property (ii) ensures that the set defends itself against attacks.
Important computational problems are to determine whether an argument belongs to some extension (credulous acceptance) or whether it belongs to all extensions (skeptical acceptance) [32, 37] . For most semantics, including the preferred semantics, the problems are located on the second level of the Polynomial Hierarchy [36] .
It is known that the acceptance problems can be solved in polynomial time if the directed graph of the argumentation framework is acyclic, noeven (contains no even cycles), symmetric, or bipartite [35, 4, 24, 36] . Thus, these four properties give rise to islands of tractability for abstract argumentation, and one can ask whether a backdoor approach can be developed to solve the acceptance problems for instances that are close to an island. Here it is natural to consider deletion backdoor sets, i.e., we delete arguments to obtain an instance that belongs to the considered class. For the islands of acyclic, symmetric, and bipartite argumentation frameworks we can find a backdoor using the fixed-parameter algorithms for directed feedback vertex set [20] , vertex cover [33] and for graph bipartization [80] , respectively. For finding a vertex set of size k that kills all directed cycles of even length we only know an XP algorithm which is based on a deep result [82] .
However, it turns out that using the backdoor set is tricky and quite different from satisfiability and answer set programming [68] . The acceptance problems remain (co-)NP-hard for instances that can be made symmetric or bipartite by deleting one single argument. On the other hand, if an instance can be made acyclic or noeven by deleting k arguments, then the acceptance problems can be solved in time 3 k n c . The base 3 of the running time comes from the fact that the evaluation algorithm considers three different cases for the arguments in the backdoor set: (1) the argument is in the acceptable set, (2) the argument is not in the set and is attacked by at least one argument from the set, and (3) the argument is not in the set but is not attacked by any argument from the set.
Conclusion
Backdoor sets aim at exploiting hidden structures in real-world problem instances. The effectiveness of this approach has been investigated empirically in [31, 42, 59, 85] and in many cases, small backdoor sets were found for large industrial instances.
As several backdoor set problems reduce to well-investigated core problems from parameterized complexity, such as VERTEX COVER, 3-HITTING SET, FEEDBACK VERTEX SET, and their variants, a few decades of focused research efforts can be used to detect backdoor sets efficiently. Nevertheless, several questions remain open. In particular, the parameterized complexity classification of several permissive problems seems challenging. As discussed at the end of Subsection 11.3, the classification of variants of the FEEDBACK VERTEX SET problem would also shed some light on backdoor set detection problems in nonmonotonic reasoning.
We believe that more research in this direction is necessary if we want to explain the good practical performance of heuristic SAT solvers. Directions for future research could involve multivariate parameterizations of backdoor problems and the consideration of backdoors to combinations of different base classes.
